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Abstract
It is initially odd to ask whether Confucianism is compatible
with systems of law. Confucian thought has co-existed with
Chinese legal systems throughout the various dynasties of
China’s long history. Nevertheless, despite the extensive laws
that China has boasted, traditional Chinese legal thought is not
typically recognized as a genuine rule-of-law system, given its
focus on moral development and the “rule of man.” In this essay,
we argue that Confucianism, specifically Pre-Qin Confucianism,
is compatible with the rule-of-law. We examine the different
models of compatibility, including “soft compatibilism” in which
we examine whether abstract concepts between Confucianism
and legal systems are compatible, as well as co-existing and
integrating compatibilism.
Co-existing compatibilism sees
Confucianism and the law occupying different spheres within the
same legal system while integrating compatibilism sees
Confucianism and the law coming together into a new system. In
this way, Confucianism offers China an alternative to liberal
democratic and Marxist theories of law.
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INTRODUCTION

To the Twentieth Century Chinese lawyer and legal
philosopher John C. H. Wu, Chinese legal thought was
dominated by a “backward and stagnant” conception of law
caused by a devotion to the limited moral philosophy of
Confucianism.3 Law, for Dr. Wu, at least at that time, could not
sprout from morality. Therefore, the Confucian model for the
law was inferior to the Legalist school of Shang Yang and Han
Fei, which advocated clear laws and strict punishments.
Following his friend, the Supreme Court Justice and champion
of Twentieth Century American legal realism Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Dr. Wu argued that the law could not be limited in
its concern for the virtuous few, but must be designed to take
into account the unvirtuous many.4 With the introduction of
Western influences at the end of the Nineteenth Century, the
Chinese legal tradition began to move away from the Confucian
“strait-jacket” which had left China with a stagnant and
moralistic view of the law.5 Confucianism, for all of its qualities,
was not helpful in Dr. Wu’s early project of “Holmesianiz[ing]
the Law of China!”6
Dr. Wu maintained a prevalent role in the development of
the law in the Republic of China, the political entity in which he
lived. He received degrees in the United States and Europe,
published articles in American and Chinese law reviews, held
teaching positions at the Comparative Law School of China in
Shanghai and Northwestern University in Chicago, and served
as a judge for the Provisional Court of Shanghai.7 He also
maintained extensive correspondences with some of the legal
luminaries of his time, including Felix Frankfurter, Roscoe
Pound, and Justice Holmes.8 Dr. Wu went on to be the principal

3. Note, Dr. Wu’s Constitution, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2300, 2318 (2019).
4. See John C. H. Wu, The Struggle Between Government of Laws and
Government of Men in the History of China, 5 CHINA L. REV. 53, 62 (1932).
5. Id. at 68.
6. JOHN C. H. WU, BEYOND EAST & WEST 206 (2018). Professor Teemu
Ruskola, however, notes that reception of Chinese law in the West was not
wholly negative. See TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE UNITED
STATES, AND MODERN LAW (2013). He notes, for example, that American
statesman Benjamin Franklin admired the Qing legal code. Id. at 44.
7. Dr. Wu’s Constitution, supra note 3, at 2300.
8. Id. at 2300–11.
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author of the first draft of the Permanent Constitution of the
Republic of China, a constitution that was eventually ratified in
1946 and continues in some form in Taiwan.9 His many roles in
China serves as an example of the Chinese legal mind of that
period: a Western-educated individual that sought to modernize
China by making the country more Western. Democracy,
fundamental rights, and the rule-of-law were the key principles
of the era, with only a minimized, or even privatized, place for
Confucius.
Later in life, Dr. Wu would express gratitude to the ancient
Chinese philosophies of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism,
describing himself as being born in their “milieu.”10 His
thankfulness for these native traditions of China came from
their role as his pedagogues for his eventual conversion to
Catholicism, and though he never shakes his condescension for
some of the more superstitious aspects of these traditions, he
acknowledges how he was shaped by them.11 For all of his
attempts to modernize his country through the Western legal
theory which he had spent his life studying, Dr. Wu could never
truly rid his country, and himself, of the Confucianism that
permeated his world.
Nor has China ever been able to shake its “indigenous
resources” in its recent project of renewing Chinese law.12 Many
contemporary thinkers have drawn from Confucianism, as well
as other traditional Chinese philosophies, in constructing
alternative ways to address China’s current controversies. This
includes the New Confucianism (新儒家), a contemporary
movement represented by Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, and Tang
Junyi.13 Outside of the New Confucians, there have been many
contemporary philosophers who have included interpretations of
Confucianism in relation to Western philosophical traditions.
The contemporary engagement of Confucianism is influential
among philosophy departments in China and abroad.14
9. Id. at 2307.
10. WU, supra note 6, at 44.
11. Id.
12. RUSKOLA, supra note 6, at 227.
13. See NEW CONFUCIANISM: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 1–42 (John
Makeham, ed., 2003).
14. See TONGDONG BAI, AGAINST POLITICAL EQUALITY: THE CONFUCIAN
CASE (2020); DANIEL A. BELL, THE CHINA MODEL: POLITICAL MERITOCRACY AND
THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRACY (2015); Baogang He, Four Models of the Relationship
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Nevertheless, Western notions of the rule-of-law and democratic
theory still remain influential, and even the most
unconventional contemporary Confucian thinkers still conceive
of a political system with elements of democratic forms of
government.15 Even with a revival of Confucian thought in
China, the Western political theory remains influential and
cannot be ignored.
It is difficult to define “Confucianism.” Covering various
themes, Confucianism is expansive as a school of thought,
having undergone various transformations throughout Chinese
history.
In this essay, we focus specifically on pre-Qin
Confucianism, specifically drawing from the Analects. Further,
as Confucius did not have a general philosophy of jurisprudence,
we will draw from political interpretations of Confucius’s moral
philosophy. It is from this interpretation of Confucianism that
we think is compatible with systems of law.
At first glance, it is odd to ask whether Confucianism is
compatible with law. Confucianism has long co-existed with
Chinese legal systems throughout various dynasties. Eric Li, for
example, argues that China historically incorporated both
Confucianism and Legalism to develop its government.16 While
Confucianism emerged over Legalism as the preeminent
philosophy of China, co-existing happily with Buddhism and
Daoism, Li acknowledged that Legalism continued to remain an
“integral” part of the Chinese government.17 Nevertheless, as
discussed above, Chinese law is not recognized as a genuine ruleof-law system, given its focus on moral development and the
“rule of man.”
In this essay, however, we argue that
Confucianism is compatible with the rule-of-law.18
Between Confucianism and Democracy, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICAL
THOUGHT: DEBATES AND PERSPECTIVES 131 (Fred Dallmayr & Zhao Tingyang
eds., 2012); QING JIANG, A CONFUCIAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HOW CHINA’S
ANCIENT PAST CAN SHAPE ITS POLITICAL FUTURE (Daniel A. Bell & Ruiping Fan
eds., Edmund Ryden trans., 2013); YONG XIA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE CONTEXT OF CHINA (2011).
15. The unconventional Confucian thinker Jiang Qing, for example, has
argued for a form of government in which Confucianism permeates society at
the foundational level. See generally JIANG, supra note 14. Though
unconventional, however, Jiang’s model still envisions a trifurcated legislature
with each house possessing checks-and-balances over the others. Id.
16. Eric Li, China and the Rule of Law, 3 AM. AFFS. J. 133 (2019).
17. Id.
18. Our methodology in this paper will follow the methodology we used in
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One attempt to address the question of compatibility is
Professor He Baogang’s identification of four models describing
the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. In his
essay, Professor He identifies the models of the relationship as
conflict, compatible, hybrid, and critical.19 However, even within
his compatibility model, we can identify four additional models
to describe the different ways the systems can be compatible:
soft
compatibilism,
hard
compatibilism,
co-existing
compatibilism, and integrating compatibilism.20
Soft compatibilism and hard compatibilism examine what is
compatible between Confucianism and democracy, such as the
elements, aspects, or institutions being compared between
traditions.
Co-existing compatibilism and integrating
compatibilism, on the other hand, distinguish how Confucianism
and democracy can be compatible. The primary concern of these
models is what a government that combines the two traditions
might look like and how the traditions’ different elements might
work together. 21
II.

SOFT COMPATIBILISM: FA, LI, AND LAW

We will begin by looking at the “what” question. “What” are
we comparing when we say that Confucianism is compatible
with the rule of law? Asking the “what” question gives us two
models: hard compatibilism and soft compatibilism. Hard
compatibilism looks at the different legal institutions between
Confucian and democratic systems.22 However, identifying
institutions between the traditions is demanding as the
development of institutions is often tied with their historical
background.23 Instead, we will begin by examining the abstract
our examination of the compatibility of Confucianism and democracy.
Specifically, we examine compatibility through the four models of
compatibilism we established in the previous analysis (i.e., soft, hard, coexisting, integrating). See Sophia Gao & Aaron Walayat, Confucianism and
Democracy: Four Models of Compatibilism, J. CHINESE HUMANITIES
(forthcoming 2021). While that analysis focused on the compatibility of
Confucianism and democracy generally, this examination is primarily
concerned with Confucianism and the rule of law.
19. He, supra note 14.
20. Gao & Walayat, supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id.
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ideas or values upon which these legal institutions are based or
attempt to manifest.
The comparison of abstract concepts is what we call soft
compatibilism.
Professor He, discussing this comparison,
compares it to “color matching” referring to the comparison of
concepts within one system with its counterparts in another.24
In this section, we will compare the abstract conceptions of the
law (li and fa) between Confucian and Western democratic
systems.
We now have the difficult task of asking what is meant by
the word “law.” Latin has two words that can be translated to
mean law—jus, denoting the abstract nature of the law, and lex,
referring to enacted laws.25 More modernly, the Austinian
definition of law describes the law as the command of a sovereign
which an inferior must obey under threat of punishment.26
Alternatively, sociologist Eugen Ehrlich refers to a “living law,”
composed of norms resultant from influences outside of legal and
political systems, including family, religious, and other social
influences.27 Luke T. Lee and Whalen W. Lai argue that there
are two conceptions of the law in Chinese philosophy mirroring
the Austin-Ehrlich definitions of law: fa (法) and li (禮).28
Fa is the definition of the law associated with the Legalist
school of thought. The Legalists “rel[ied] on the force of
sanctions to obtain obedience to and compliance with the law,
and therefore . . . stress[ed] government by fa or decree, as
opposed to the Confucian emphasis on government by man and
li.”29 Thus, while fa is defined as “law,” its scope is narrow,
focusing mainly on decree and punishment. Li is more difficult
to translate, but it has been described as “propriety, ethics, or

24. He, supra note 14, at 138.
25. See Caleb Wan, Note, Confucianism and Higher Law Thinking in
Ancient China, 10 REGENT J. INT’L L. 77, 78 (2013) (citing Liang Zhiping,
Explicating “Law”: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal
Culture, 3 J. CHINESE L. 55, 56 (1989)).
26. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
(1832).
27. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
493 (2009).
28. Luke T. Lee & Whalen W. Lai, The Chinese Conceptions of Law:
Confucian, Legalist, and Buddhist, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1307, 1308 (1978).
29. Id. at 1309.
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moral rules of correct conduct and good manners.”30 In the
narrowest sense, li refers to religious rituals. However, in a
broader sense, it can also denote a “variety of duties and polite
behaviors in all customary situations involving social
relationships.”31
Confucius was pessimistic with the use of the law and
punishments (xing) alone.32 Analects 2:3 expresses this view:
If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought
to be given them by punishments, they will try to
avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame.
If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to
be given them by the rules of propriety, they will
have the sense of shame, and moreover will
become good.33
Confucius’s pessimism about the law in the form of
punishments is that it would not build a sense of shame, as the
people would merely seek to avoid punishments. It is not enough
for Confucius to avoid punishments, as his philosophical goals
were not simply to create a society that avoided legal
punishments, but to cultivate individuals to actively seek good.
Instead, people ought to be led by virtue and li, in which they
would have a healthy sense of shame that would lead to the selfcorrection of their wrongness into a good moral character. Thus,
the goal is not just to prevent misconduct, but to develop proper
moral emotions, like a sense of shame to moral shortcomings
which would motivate moral development.
While Confucianism places less emphasis on the law as
punishment (fa and xing), the more abstract notion of li plays an
important role in Confucian thought. Li is often translated as
“rituals,” “propriety,” “politeness,” or “etiquette.” For Confucius,
30. Id. at 1308.
31. Wan, supra note 25, at 85; see also Herbert H. P. Ma, The Legalization
of Confucianism and Its Impact on Family Relationships, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 667,
670, n.13 (1987) (describing how li originally referred only to “religious
sacrifice” but has also come to include “ceremony, ritual, decorum, rules of
propriety, good customs, etc.”).
32. See, e.g., 1 CONFUCIUS, THE CHINESE CLASSICS: THE LIFE AND
TEACHINGS OF CONFUCIUS bk. II (James Legge trans., 2d ed. London, N.
Trübner 1869).
33. Id.
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li was a revival of rituals purportedly practiced in the Zhou
dynasty. These rituals were deeply focused on religious aspects
such as ancestor veneration, but also applied to other situations.
Confucius also believed that li would be helpful in moral
education. One of the main functions of li is to regulate people’s
actions and attitudes in order for them to better perform their
social roles. Li’s function can also be instrumental, serving as a
means to cultivate virtues through ritual practice.34 Confucius
emphasized that the mechanical practice of li would not be
enough, and participants needed to develop proper emotions
toward the practice of li.35 Li could also help in reforming
peoples’ moral emotions and virtues.36
Rituals, generally, include a wide range of content which
include the ceremonies of birth, death, marriage, initiation,
healing, harvest, and religious observance. Li also includes how
one dresses, walks, and sits. Like rituals, li touches on people’s
“core emotions” and reveals a society’s values.37 The law can also
serve this function, joining individuals in solidarity within their
group and imposing certain conventions and obligatory
behaviors. Both law and ritual become part of the “essential
constitution of human societies,” developing “a set of shared
understandings about how political power is to be allocated
among, and exercised by, the remembers of a given social
organization.”38 Similarly, li can be compared to Western
conceptions of the law, albeit in an abstract sense. While
Western law is still possessed by legal positivism, which
conceptualizes the law as commands or as rules, there have also
been contemporary legal theorists like John Noonan and Walter
Otto Weyrauch who recognize the important role of legal
34. See Kwong-loi Shun, Jen and Li in the Analects, 43 PHIL. E. & W. 457,
457–79 (1993) (providing more information on the “instrumental” function of
li).
35. See, e.g., CONFUCIUS, supra note 32, at bk. XVII. Confucius notes that
ritual is more than “gems and silk,” referring to the importance of ritual beyond
mere ornamentation. Id. The importance of li is not in simply keeping the
rules, but in developing the moral emotions through the practice of rituals.
This can be compared to the use of “burnt offerings” in the Old Testament
where God sometimes notes the meaninglessness of offerings made
mechanically. See Psalm 50:8 (King James); Isaiah 1:11 (King James).
36. See CONFUCIUS, supra note 32, at bk. VIII.
37. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1181, 1181 (2005).
38. Id. at 1181.
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rituals.39
The late Judge John Noonan, Jr. discussed legal masks and
legal rituals in his book, Persons and Masks of the Law.40
“Masks” refer to legal constructs that hide an individual’s
humanity within the legal process.41 The clearest example is the
masking of people as property in the case of slavery.42 Noonan
condemned the use of masks as problematic, as they breed
injustice by allowing courts to render judgments with little
concern for the humanity of the parties.43 Writing in response,
Walter Otto Weyrauch recognized these problematic uses, but
also noted the value of legal masks as well as their
inevitability.44 The uses of “masks” are inevitable, as the notion
of “law as mask” is used to “invoke a higher authority in a
dramatic ceremony” by “channel[ing] emotions and events into
fixed styles of reasoning that are, regardless of their intrinsic
truth, aesthetically appealing and persuasive to the participants
and the community.”45 Legal rituals, therefore, have an
aesthetic role in being persuasive in people’s lives and in
constructing the appearance of authority. Some of the practical
aspects of masks, Weyrauch notes, include aiding in the exercise
of control, being “tools for the enforcement of social policies,” and
supporting the legal system’s “peace-keeper” function.46 The
uses of legal masks described by Weyrauch, however, only note
the helpfulness of these masks in “control,” “enforcement,” and
“peace-keeping.”47 “Legal masks” are a part of legal rituals
where the ceremonial masks and the law play a similar social
function.48 These uses are limited, then, by the fact that the
masks are useful in restraining the participants of the legal
system.
Confucius would acknowledge these uses of masks and legal
39. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW
(1976); Walter Otto Weyrauch, Law as Mask—Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66
CALIF. L. REV. 699 (1978).
40. NOONAN, supra note 39.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 14–19.
43. Id.
44. Weyrauch, supra note 39, at 721–25.
45. Id. at 725–26.
46. Id. at 714.
47. Id. at 714–18.
48. Id. at 717.
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rituals. Li regulates conduct by providing rules meant to guide
people to making right actions in the proper situations.49 As he
states in the Analects 15.18: “The superior man in everything
considers righteousness to be essential.
He performs it
according to the rules of propriety. He brings it forth in
humility. He completes it with sincerity. This is indeed a
superior man.”50 However, Confucius would go a step farther
than Weyrauch, not only examining the usefulness of masks in
restraining people toward proper actions, but as offering a
John Finnis identifies
pedagogical characteristic to li.51
“aesthetic experience” as one of his basic human goods.52 He
writes: “the aesthetic attitude is constituted by a unique balance
of intellect and feeling in the contemplation and grasp of a
symbol that expresses the idea of emotion or feeling.”53 As
Bullough notes, contemplating art requires a “psychical
distance” between the work at the audience, a distance that
comes from “separating the object and its appeal from one’s self,
49. Wan notes that li, in the “broadest sense” include the “rules of
propriety and proper conduct for all institutions and relationships.” Wan,
supra note 25, at 85–86. Li in this sense provides requirements, even rules,
for proper conduct in private relationships, most reflected in Confucius’s
concern for filial piety, or the duties that people owe to their familial relations,
specifically their parents. Confucians also emphasized “governing by li” and
“teaching by example.” Id. This indicates that Confucius saw li as also guiding
public conduct and in an ideal Confucian order, a good ruler must “provide the
people with an example of proper behavior according to li.” Id.
50. CONFUCIUS, supra note 32, at bk. XV.
51. There are different interpretations of Confucius regarding the
relationship of li with traditional rules. Joel Kupperman, for example,
acknowledges that Confucius’s li was “very closely related to rules and
traditions.” JOEL J. KUPPERMAN, LEARNING FROM ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 33–34
(1999). Nevertheless, Kupperman writes that other commentators, like H.G.
Creel, argue that Confucian li was not only grounded on traditional practice,
but also involves “the ability to modify them as circumstances and common
sense might require.” Id. (citing H.G. CREEL, CONFUCIUS, THE MAN AND THE
MYTH 85 (1949)). Kupperman cites the Analects’s “general avoidance of pat [sic]
solutions and in his willingness to adjust to a student’s personality what he
says to the student.” Id. With a moral philosophy that was not based on brightlines rules, Kupperman notes that Confucius instead emphasized moral
education, internalizing the relationships embodied in li not as simple, brightline rules, but as rules that develop personal character into someone who is
able to come to right moral decisions in particular situation. Thus, moral
education is central. See id.
52. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 87 (Paul Craig ed.,
2d ed. 2011).
53. John M. Finnis, Reason and Passion: The Constitutional Dialectic of
Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 236 (1967).
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by putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends.”54 The
contemplation of art also contributes to developing our ability to
talk about beauty. As Iris Murdoch wrote, “[w]e develop
language in the context of looking.”55
Understanding li as a form of art or drama, the value of the
ritual practice comes from what is learned from contemplating
rituals at a “psychical distance.”
As Bullough notes,
contemplation of art at this distance comes from separating the
rituals from our practical needs and ends, allowing observers to
contemplate the rituals as things-in-themselves.56 In observing
li from a psychical distance, that is, observing li outside of the
practical aspect of ritual behaviors, observers are able to
contemplate the moral and emotional development
communicated through ritual. While this type of contemplation
may initially seem like a practical benefit, note that this moral
and emotional development is not said to occur because of the
rituals themselves but from the communicated meaning
contemplated from the rituals. Contemplating rituals as works
of art provides an aesthetic experience that both develops moral
emotions as well as developing the “language” by which we
understand the rituals themselves.57
What would it mean to look at the law as a ritual from a
“psychical distance?” The legal positivist and legal realist
interpretations of the law would likely be unable to see the law
from this distance, as it would be unable to contemplate the law
separated from its practical needs and ends. However, observing
the law from a psychical distance allows observers to
contemplate the law, or the meaning within legal rituals,
separated from the immediate needs and ends of the law as
applied in the present case. Observing the law from a distance
54. EDWARD BULLOUGH, AESTHETICS 96 (Elizabeth M. Wilkinson ed.,
1957).
55. IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 33 (1971).
56. See BULLOUGH, supra note 54, at 93–130.
57. Drawing from Iris Murdoch’s observation that we develop “language
in the context of looking,” observing ritual from a “psychical distance” creates
an understanding of the rituals as ends-in-themselves. MURDOCH, supra note
55, at 3. The value of the ritual is not the conservative benefits of social
cohesion through cultural practice, but as moral communication of the person’s
relation to himself, others, and the world as described in the way rituals frame
that person’s relations to others. In this way, persons develop a “language” or
an understanding of their relations to others through observations of the
communications within rituals.
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allows observers to contemplate the narratives within the law.
John Noonan, as discussed above, provides an important
contemplation of the law in this way, noting the masks of the
law.58 While the judges described by Noonan applied the masks
of the law in an immediate way, Noonan observes the uses of
masks to hide an individual’s humanity.59 He observes how
these fictions change how people are viewed within legal cases.60
This is because peoples’ humanity is “masked” by the law.61 The
law, therefore, assists in “developing a language in the context
of looking.”62 By contemplating the law, we can see how the law
values certain behaviors generally.
It is through this
contemplation that we develop our language of understanding
what we are observing. This language notes the difference
between “relevant” and “admissible” evidence and the existence
of mens rea in committing a murder. The law, like li, has ritual
significance in people’s lives, developing a “language in the
context of looking” that may be internalized by the participants
in the legal process.63
In Confucianism, it is difficult to separate the ethical from
the aesthetic. As the Analects 12:8 states:
Kih Tsze-shing said, ‘In a superior man it is only
the substantial qualities which are wanted;—why
should we seek for ornamental accomplishments?’
Tsze-kung said, ‘Alas! Your words, sir, show you
to be a superior man, but four horses cannot
overtake the tongue. Ornament is as substance;
substance is as ornament. The hide of a tiger or a
leopard stripped of its hair is like the hide of a dog

58. See generally NOONAN, supra note 39.
59. Id. at 19.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 20.
62. MURDOCH, supra note 55, at 30.
63. Miller notes that both law and ritual “joins the individual in solidarity
with the group” and “imposes on people certain conventional and obligatory
forms of behavior.” Miller, supra note 37, at 1181. As part of the “essential
constitution of human societies,” law and ritual provide a “constitutive” form
of self-conceptualization and internalization of the communicated values
within the ritual. Id. Law and ritual develop an understanding within its own
conceptualization, or a “language in the context of looking” to use Murdoch’s
term. MURDOCH, supra note 55, at 30.
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or a goat stripped of its hair.’64
In the above quote, there is a substance within the
ornamentation of rituals, an acknowledgment that the aesthetic
contemplation of ritual practice ties moral emotions into the
rituals themselves. David Wong writes, “a graceful and wholehearted expression of respect can be beautiful precisely because
it reflects the extent that the agent has made this moral attitude
part of her second nature.”65 In this way, “beauty has a moral
dimension.”66
An aesthetic appreciation of both ceremonial rituals
through li and legal rituals through the legal process provides
an aesthetic appreciation of the virtues expressed in rituals. By
observing both rituals at a psychical distance, people can
contemplate the meaning within the practice deriving an
aesthetic experience of the virtues communicated in rituals and
developing a language of understanding these communicated
virtues through contemplation.
III. CO-EXISTING COMPATIBILITY
Now that we have examined the ways Confucian ideas can
be compatible with the idea of the law, we will now look to the
question of how Confucianism can be compatible with the law.
We propose two different models in addressing the “how”
question: the co-existing model and the integrating model. The
co-existing model sees Confucianism and the law co-existing in
real ways within a legal system.67 While some compromise will
be needed, a co-existing model sees both Confucianism and the
law existing in recognizable forms within each system. The
integrating mode, on the other hand, sees the two traditions
integrating into a new political and legal system.68
We will begin with the co-existing model. This model is,
historically, the most recognizable. As Luke T. Lee and Whalen
W. Lai acknowledge, while Confucianism was not optimistic
64. CONFUCIUS, supra note 32, at bk. XII.
65. David Wong, Chinese Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed. 2020).
66. Id.
67. Gao & Walayat, supra note 18.
68. Id.
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about incorporating positive law into its philosophy,
Confucianism co-existed with the philosophical tradition of
Legalism throughout most of China’s history.69 Most Chinese
dynasties since the Han dynasty (207 B.C.-220 A.D.), have
maintained Confucianism as a guiding philosophy, while also
utilizing extensive positive laws and punishments inspired by
the Legalist tradition.
Given that Confucianism always
maintained “clear and definite purposes of government,” it was
not uncommon in China’s history to make Confucian doctrines
“the content of the law, [with] the criminal code bec[oming] the
instrument of executing such content.”70 Herbert H. P. Ma refers
to this as the “Legalization of Confucianism.”71 Ma notes,
however, that this phenomenon “brought disrespect and even
damage to both the law and Confucianism,” as “‘[c]ompulsory’
morality” was unable to bring about moral development, which
is the first priority of Confucius and Mencius.72
Contemporarily, however, Confucians can still maintain an
influence outside of being the concrete content of the law. In
some cases, given Confucianism’s influence on a country’s
culture, Confucianism can also serve as a guiding influence in a
court’s interpretation of laws. The clearest example of this is
seen in the experience of South Korea. In a 2003 article,
Chaihark Hahm discusses two cases in which the Constitutional
Court of Korea faced issues related to Confucian traditions in
Korean culture and whether they conflicted with South Korea’s
democratic constitution.73
The first case Hahm discusses was a 1998 case in which the
Constitutional Court struck down a law concerning family
rituals, a form of sumptuary law.74 Sumptuary laws were a
common part of Confucian Korea, governing what and how much
people could consume in family rituals, though traditionally,
there were traditional differences based on social status and
class.75 However, in 1993, the Korean government promulgated

69. See Lee & Lai, supra note 28, at 1307.
70. Ma, supra note 31, at 673.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 674.
73. Chaihark Hahm, Law, Culture, and the Politics of Confucianism, 16
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 253 (2003).
74. Id. at 280–87.
75. Id. at 281–82.
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a sumptuary law regarding family rituals which “aimed at
obliterating or minimizing any class distinctions,” limiting
across the board “the amount people could spend on food and
drinks at family rituals.”76 The government, recognizing the
importance of such a ritual in Korean culture, sought to
minimize the inequality that would naturally stem from
differences in spending among the families.77 In 1998, the
Constitutional Court held parts of the law unconstitutional,
finding that the practice of serving food and drinks on special
occasions were part of an individual’s “general freedom of
action,” a protected constitutional right under the “right to
Further, the court found the law
pursue happiness.”78
unconstitutionally vague, as the “law allowed an exception for
food and drinks that were ‘reasonable in light of the true
meaning of family ritual and ceremony,’” a standard unclear and
certainly unobvious.79 Hahm points out that the court’s decision
had the effect of upholding traditional Confucian customs on the
basis of individualistic principles and also notes that the court
sidestepped the issue of Confucianism’s place in Korean society
by not commenting on arguments about whether matters of
ritual are better decided by the government or by social
custom.80
The second case Hahm discusses was a 1997 decision by the
Constitutional Court which struck down an article of the family
law section of the Korean Civil Code as unconstitutional.81 The
section prohibited marriages between people with the same
surname who also had the same “ancestral seat.”82 An
“ancestral seat” is a geographical location where a given
surname is believed to have originated from.83 In South Korea,
many people share the same surname, but if two people sharing
the same surname and the same ancestral seat, they were said
to be members of the same family, and their marriage would be

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 282.
Id.
Id. at 283 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 285.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Id.
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deemed incestuous.84 However, people of the same surname
from the same ancestral seat could be so numerous that large
swaths of the population with otherwise no familial ties to each
other would not be allowed to marry.85 The Constitutional Court
found the prohibition unconstitutional as it violated human
dignity and the right to pursue happiness as provided for in the
constitution.86 However, the decision was not unanimous, and
the dissenting Justices argued that the prohibition was not
inconsistent with another enshrined constitutional principle:
“the duty of the state to preserve and develop traditional
national culture.”87
In these two decisions, we see that the court’s decisions were
never expressly made on Confucian interpretations, but that
Confucianism was so entrenched in Korean culture that respect
for cultural considerations needed to be considered by the court
in making their decisions. The family ritual decision can be said
to have been made without regard for Confucian interpretations,
as the law was struck down for vagueness and for violating a
constitutional right to pursue happiness. The second decision,
specifically in the conflict between the majority and dissent, took
more seriously the issue of making decisions based on cultural
considerations; while both sides made their decision based on
enshrined constitutional rights, the dissent acknowledged that
the government had a place in protecting cultural traditions,
many of which have a strong connection with Confucianism.
Thus, Confucianism and the law can co-exist. It can exist
through Confucian traditionalism guiding private lives with
governments responsible for enshrining and protecting these
cultural practices through the force of law.
Another example would be succession laws in
predominately Chinese communities. In her investigation of the
succession laws of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China,
Lusina Ho determines that the laws of each entity were
influenced by Confucianism.88 She distinguishes between what

84. Id. at 288.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 293.
87. Id.
88. Lusina Ho, Traditional Confucian Values and Western Legal
Frameworks: The Law of Succession, in CONFUCIANISM FOR THE MODERN WORLD
288 (Daniel A. Bell & Hahm Chaibong, eds., 2003).
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she calls the “strong claim,” in which the distinctive aspects of
the laws can only be justified by Confucianism, with the “weak
claim,” in which such features of the succession law can be
justified on the Confucian values within the mind of
legislators.89 Like the Korean examples above, the “weak claim”
can draw from Confucian interpretations of societal concerns,
including culture. In her observations, Ho concludes that all
three communities—Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland
China—have special provisions for needy heirs that were
sometimes more “far-reaching” than Western counterparts, that
mainland China entitled parents to the first priority of
succession along with the decedent’s spouse and children, and
that mainland China would grant or withhold inheritance
regarding whether the claimant furnished maintenance to the
decedent.90 Here, we can see examples of succession laws being
influenced by Confucian concerns. Ho notes that the provision
for needy heirs may draw from the Confucian concept of “ren” (
仁) or “benevolence.”91 The provision of placing parents to the
first priority of succession can be seen as being influenced by the
Confucian value of xiao (孝) or “filial piety.”92 The Chinese civil
law’s consideration of whether the heir has provided support to
the decedent and its equitable adjustment of the claimant’s
share, depending on the maintenance provided, may be
influenced by the Confucian value that encourages the young to
care for the old.93
Ho interestingly notes that certain “forced heirship rules”
provide that “certain rights of inheritance cannot be curtailed by
will” and that “rules that grant provisions for the family and
dependents of the deceased irrespective of what the will says.”94
She acknowledges that forced heirship is not uncommon in civil
law countries, yet it differs greatly from common law countries
in which testamentary intent of the decedent is the “cornerstone
of [the] will.”95 Some examples of forced heirs include the

89. Id. at 288.
90. Id. at 300.
91. Id. at 302.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 303.
94. Id. at 305.
95. Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 569, 569 (2016); see Ho, supra note 88, at 305.
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decedent’s siblings and needy heirs in Chinese civil law.96 In all
of these scenarios, Ho notes that Confucianism needs not to be
the only basis of justifying these laws and that Western
liberalism may also alternatively justify these rules, including
the right of those heirs who have a “legitimate expectation” of
succession.97 While there is an inference of Confucian influence
on these laws, there is no direct evidence that these laws were
based solely on Confucian grounds.
The co-existence of Confucianism and the law goes beyond
decision-making based on legal considerations of Confucian
culture. The examples described above can be interpreted as a
weak form of Confucian influence transmitted through the
culture of Korean and predominantly Chinese communities.
However, there is room within co-existing compatibilism for
Confucianism to serve as a basis for decision-making. This
model would develop a more concrete form of Confucian
influence, allowing private arbitration to be decided with direct
reference to Confucianism in decision-making rather than
through indirect considerations for culture.98 It would be similar
to the way religious law is used in private arbitration in family
law cases where decisions are rendered through the use of
Halakha (Jewish law), Sharia (Islamic law), and Canon law
(Christian law).99 Controversies remain today, but it still
maintains a robust jurisprudence in Western democratic
countries.100 This model would apply Confucian decisionmaking as if it was religious law, though this may be a
misnomer. Nevertheless, this model would provide a familiar
form of co-existence between Confucian decision-making and a
Western legal system.
IV. INTEGRATING COMPATIBILISM
Scholars like Xu Keqian have argued that Confucianism can
96.
97.
98.
99.

See Ho, supra note 88, at 307–08.
Id. at 308.
See Gao & Walayat, supra note 18.
See generally MICHAEL J. BROYDE, SHARIA TRIBUNALS, RABBINICAL
COURTS, AND CHRISTIAN PANELS: RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION IN AMERICA AND THE
WEST (2017).
100. See generally Joshua T. Carback, On Sharia in American Family
Law: Confronting the Dangers of Legal Pluralism, 7 INT’L J. JURIS. FAM. 165
(2016).
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serve to ground typical democratic elements by offering
alternate explanations for democratic institutions or to infuse
democracy with better meaning.101 Thus, a model of integrating
compatibilism seeks to examine how Confucianism can offer
alternative explanations for legal systems and perhaps infuse
legal systems with deeper meaning. In order to examine this, it
is worth examining differing views of the “ends” of the law. To
speak of the “end” of something can be taken in many ways. In
one sense, speaking about the “end of the world” defines “end”
as the “termination,” at which point the world would no longer
exist as it once did. Alternatively, “end” can refer to an endpoint
in a linear progression. Finally, we come to the meaning of “end”
that we use for this section, that of “end” or “ends” as “goals.” In
this sense, we are speaking of the “ends of the law” as referring
to the goals, or what Lon Fuller calls the “substantive aims” of
the law.102
The Western legal tradition has struggled with the question
of the “ends of the law,” with the specific aims differing among
the different legal schools of thought. Roscoe Pound, for
example, writing from the position of sociological jurisprudence,
argues that the law is a tool of social engineering.103 He notes
four functions of the law over history, with the law first serving
as a way of (1) keeping peace in society to prevent self-redress
by a victim’s kin organization, (2) preserving the status quo, (3)
creating an environment to allow for maximum free selfassertion, and (4) satisfying the social wants of people.104
Perhaps not contradictory to Pound’s identification of the
functions of the law, H.L.A. Hart identifies “survival” as the
central human good as the main motivational factor for legal
development.105
Hart’s version of legal positivism is particularly important,
because nearly all theories finding a relationship between law
and morality is written in response to Hart. Lon Fuller, for

101. See Gao & Walayat, supra note 18 (citing Keqian Xu, Early
Confucian Principles: The Potential Theoretic Foundation of Democracy in
Modern China, 16 ASIAN PHIL. 135 (2006)).
102. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 152–84 (rev. ed. 1969).
103. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922).
104. Id. at 36–99.
105. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 191 (Penelope A. Bullock &
Joseph Raz eds., 3d ed. 2012).
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example, identifies an internal morality of the law, commenting
that there are eight desirable aspects of the law necessary to
make it effective.106 To Fuller, the end of the law is to support
an environment where individuals would be most able to
communicate with each other by “[o]pen[ing] up, maintain[ing],
and preserv[ing] the integrity of the channels of communication
by which men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, or
desire.”107
Natural law theorists take a more moral view on the
substantive ends of the law. John Finnis, for example, argues
that the law should serve to protect the basic human goods, and
while every moral decision cannot exercise every human good for
every human being, laws must be structured in a way that they
do not actively act against a basic human good.108 Finnis
identifies seven basic human goods, but notes that this list is
non-exhaustive, consisting of life, knowledge, play, aesthetic
experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion.109
Legal deontologists see the end of the law as the implementation
of a system of moral rules or principles, such as the avoidance of
moral wrongs and the protection of moral rights. One example
might be Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity, which
seeks the “coherence of the fundamental moral principles that
justify the relevant moral, political and legal past decisions in a
given domain.”110
More recently, there has been a growing scholarship within
what can be called a “virtue jurisprudence” or the “aretaic theory
of law.”111 This school of jurisprudence drawing from the virtue
106. FULLER, supra note 102, at 39. Fuller argues there are eight
principles that formed law’s internal morality:
(1) The rules are actually made and cases are not decided on an ad hoc basis
(2) The rules are publicized, or at least made available to an affected party
(3) The rules are not retroactive
(4) The rules are understandable
(5) The rules are not contradictory
(6) The rules are not impossible
(7) The rules are relatively stable and do not change frequently
(8) The announced rule is not incongruent with the rule as administered. Id.
107. Id. at 186.
108. FINNIS, supra note 52.
109. Id. at 85–90.
110. Andrei Marmor, Integrity in Law’s Empire 3 (Cornell L. Sch.
Research Paper, Paper No. 19-28 2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3422173.
111. Linghao Wang & Lawrence B. Solum, Confucian Virtue
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ethics tradition in moral philosophy sees the promotion of
“human flourishing” as the aim of the law.112 Human flourishing
is defined as a life of “rational and social activities that express
the human excellences or virtues.”113 One advocate of this
approach is Lawrence Solum, who describes a theory of law that
sees legislation as a way to promote virtue.114 Solum argues that
legislation “should aim at the promotion of human flourishing”
by “creating vibrant communities with opportunities for
meaningful work and play that engage our rational capacities,”
while also “creating the conditions for healthy emotional and
intellectual development.”115 Thus, for Solum:
The core idea [of Justice as Lawfulness] is that
justice is a disposition to be lawful, but in a special
sense that departs from the idea that lawfulness
reduces to a disposition to obey the positive law.
This departure is illuminated by substituting a
stipulated concept of a nomos for the notion of
positive law. Let us use the term nomoi in this
stipulated sense to refer to the deeply held and
widely shared social norms of a community with
human flourishing. The positive laws of a given
community can play a role similar to the nomoi to
the extent that they are promulgated by
institutions or persons whose authority is
recognised by the relevant social norms and so
long as the content of the positive laws is
consistent with substantive content of the system
of nomoi. Many positive laws correspond directly
to widely shared and deeply held social norms:
laws prohibiting murder and theft are like this.116

Jurisprudence, in LAW VIRTUE AND JUSTICE 105 (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai
eds., 2013); see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY (3d ed. 2007). MacIntyre’s book is considered to have inspired the
revived interest in virtue ethics.
112. Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue as The End of Law: An Aretaic Theory of
Legislation, 9 JURIS. 6, 6 (2018).
113. Id. at 7.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 10–11.
116. Id. at 13–14.
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Solum notes, however, that positive laws could directly
conflict with the nomoi, though conflicts are not necessarily fatal
and positive laws could co-exist with contradictory nomoi.117
Solum’s theory of law focuses on the promotion of nomoi, or the
development of communities that “encourage the internalisation
of the widely shared and deeply held social norms that are
consistent with human flourishing.”118 Solum’s aretaic theory of
law, drawing from virtue ethics, while Aristotelian in its
influence, is compatible with Confucian ethics, at least
Confucian ethics interpreted as a form of virtue ethics. Solum
and Linghao Wang later developed a theory of “virtue
jurisprudence” influenced by Confucianism.119 Solum and
Wang’s virtue jurisprudence is an example of integrating
compatibilism, as their project seeks to reconcile individual
freedom with a social order developed by the Confucian notion
of harmony.120 Drawing from li, they identify “harmony of
society and harmony of the individual” as the central end of the
law within their theory.121 Li plays both a social coordinative
function by directing the harmony of society and ordering
everyone into their proper positions in the community while at
the same time developing voluntary compliance by individuals
with the law, which is related to li’s expressive function.122 To
Solum and Wang, “[i]ndividuals can express their emotions or
exercise their virtues smoothly with the help of Li and follow
their own sentiments and desires without creating a breach of
Li.”123 With enough “external proper social circumstances and
the natural development of affective capacity without
disruption, humans can experience an inner harmony between
their emotional state[s] and the requirements of virtue.”124
They note, however, that because li and the law do not share
common functions of expression and disposition, the law’s ability
to “foster autonomous harmony” is limited as it is unable to play
the same pervasive role in shaping values and virtues the same

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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way that li can.125 The correct use of names, therefore, would
help to identify certain legal principles within reality and help
citizens to internalize these legal norms and build a motivation
to obey the law.126 The proper use of names, therefore, has an
important part in the communicative aspects of the law. By
focusing on the proper definitions of names and concepts within
the law, a Confucian virtue jurisprudence would seek to ensure
that the legal definitions of legal concepts correspond with
reality. Ensuring that the names of concepts within the law
correspond with reality would encourage people to internalize
the proper behaviors communicated within the law into
behaviors in reality. This would encourage people to understand
the definitions of the relationships within li when participating
in the legal process. A Confucian theory of law would seek to
define these narratives and the relationships they represent.
While it may not be committed to enshrining principles of li
within positive law, it would ensure that these inherent
relationships are defined within the context of the values of li.
Further, given Confucius’s emphasis on the proper use of names,
a Confucian virtue jurisprudence would need to go beyond
merely enforcing li through the law. It should instead focus on
identifying consistent names between concepts in the law and in
125. Id. at 123.
126. Id. at 127. The “correct use of names” is translated as “zhengming.”
The importance of the uses of names is discussed in Analects 13:3, which reads:
“[Zi Lu] said, ‘The [ruler] of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you to
administer the government. What will you consider the first thing to be done?’
The Master replied, ‘What is necessary is to rectify names.’ ‘So, indeed!’ said
[Zi Lu]. ‘You are wide of the mark Why must there be such rectification?’ The
Master said, ‘How uncultivated you are, [You]! A superior man, in regard to
what he does not know, shows a cautious reserve.’ ‘If names be not correct,
language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in
accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.
‘When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music will not
flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be
properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people
do not know how to move hand or foot. ‘Therefore, a superior man considers it
necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that
what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man
requires, is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect.’” CONFUCIUS,
supra note 32, at bk. XIII. From this passage, Confucius notes the importance
of having names in proper accord with reality in order to build an
understandable moral language. Likewise, a Confucian theory of law would
focus on ensuring that the legal definitions of things are correctly in accord
with reality in order for people to properly internalize the definitions
communicated in the law.

23

2020

CONFUCIANISM AND LAW

257

reality, communicating their applicability both within and
outside of the legal process.
An integrating compatibilism model seeks to infuse
concepts with additional, and perhaps fuller meaning, both in
identifying an “end” of the law as well as providing additional
meaning to the narratives inherent within the law. Wang and
Solum have provided one of the strongest attempts to identify a
new system which acknowledges Confucianism and the law. The
integrating model takes a step further than previous Chinese
dynasties’ attempts to enforce Confucianism by the law.
Instead, this model does not simply seek to enforce li, but to
construct systems which apply li into legal systems, providing
the law with deeper ritual meaning. By doing this, the law
would be a way to communicate virtue and right actions through
the observation of right behaviors within the legal relationships
protected in legal systems. Such a model may provide a
foundation for a landscape that is fertile for moral cultivation
and the attainment of moral virtues.
The most important thing integrating compatibilism
provides is an examination of the meaning of the law. To say
that Confucianism can inflect the law with deeper meaning
requires observers to ask what the meaning of the law is, or more
properly, what are the ends and purposes of the law. A
Confucian virtue jurisprudence, as well as virtue jurisprudence
among other virtue ethics traditions like Neo-Aristotelianism or
Stoicism, sees virtue as the end of the law, with the law not
simply enforcing “virtuous” behaviors, but by creating an
environment in which a human being can pursue virtues and, by
pursuing such virtue, flourish. Wang and Solum identify
“harmony” as the state of affairs in which human beings are
most able to pursue virtues.127 However, the law is not simply
relegated to providing a system in which material needs are
filled, but must be incorporated within the pursuit of virtues
themselves. The law in an integrating model serves as a way for
individuals to participate in pursuing virtues within the legal
process.
The integration of Confucianism and the law leads to the
creation of a new system in which these two elements are
identifiable but also incorporated. It does not only see the law
127. Wang & Solum, supra note 111, at 134.
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as enforcing Confucian rituals, as was discussed in the examples
of co-existing models, but also seeks to utilize the law to pursue
Confucian ends: a harmonious society and the pursuit of virtues.
It does this by providing legal identification of the relationships
within human society in order to assist in internalizing these
relationships as well as developing legal rituals in which people
would be able to practice li.
V.

CONCLUSION

To say two traditions are “compatible” requires an
examination of “what” is compatible and “how” they are
compatible. We hope that we have taken the first few steps into
examining the different ways that Confucianism is compatible
with the law. In discussing the “what” question, we can see how
different abstract concepts such as rituals play an important role
in both Confucianism and in systems of the law. Also, in
examining the “how” question, we can also see ways in which
Confucianism and the law can exist within one system in a
meaningful way.
While many Chinese dynasties have
attempted to combine both Confucian philosophy and
complicated legal systems within their political culture, a
compatible view goes beyond merely the “legalization of
Confucianism.” Instead, it is a “Confucianization of the law,”
seeking to expand the nature and functions of the law as a way
to promote virtues rather than simply a pragmatic tool of
coercion.
While a Confucian view of the law would certainly see the
law as an opportunity for social engineering, the engineering
would not come from coercion, but from providing the law with
ritual significance which participants in the legal system would,
hopefully, internalize. Confucianism does not need to be
abandoned to modernity, for it provides indigenous alternatives
that are compatible with systems of law. More than simply an
example of a backward rule-of-men understanding of Chinese
law, Confucianism offers the possibility of a Chinese law that
looks beyond mere commands of the sovereign, touching upon
the “soul” of the Chinese legal subject.
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